N234PM

Destroyed
Fatal

PIPER PA46-500TPS/N: 4697200

Accident Details

Date
Wednesday, November 9, 2022
NTSB Number
CEN23FA031
Location
Bignell, NE
Event ID
20221109106270
Coordinates
41.081515, -100.613290
Aircraft Damage
Destroyed
Highest Injury
Fatal
Fatalities
2
Serious Injuries
0
Minor Injuries
0
Uninjured
0
Total Aboard
2

Probable Cause and Findings

The pilot’s flight into low instrument flight rules conditions and turbulence, which resulted in spatial disorientation, loss of control, and an impact with terrain. Contributing to the accident was the pilot’s lack of total instrument experience.

Aircraft Information

Registration
Make
PIPER
Serial Number
4697200
Engine Type
Turbo-prop
Year Built
2005
Model / ICAO
PA46-500TPP46T
Aircraft Type
Fixed Wing Single Engine
No. of Engines
1
Seats
6
FAA Model
PA46-500TP

Registered Owner (Current)

Name
DIAMOND ENTERPRISES LLC
Address
404 HILL ST
City
LINCOLN
State / Zip Code
NE 68502-3315
Country
United States

Analysis

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn November 9, 2022, about 0934 central standard time, a Piper PA46-500TP, N234PM, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Bignell, Nebraska. The pilot and passenger sustained fatal injuries. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 business flight.

According to air traffic control information, the pilot established contact with Denver Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZDV), reported inbound to the North Platte Regional Airport (LBF), North Platte, Nebraska, and the controller issued the current altimeter setting. The controller asked the pilot for the preferred approach and he requested the instrument landing system (ILS) runway 30 approach. At the request of the pilot, the controller provided vectors to the approach and instructed the pilot to fly to a heading of 230°. The pilot requested to begin the descent, and the controller cleared the pilot to turn right to 280° and descend to 7,000 ft mean sea level (msl). The controller then instructed the pilot to descend to 5,000 ft msl and turn right heading 280°, maintain 5,000 ft msl until established on the ILS, and cleared the pilot for the ILS runway 30 approach. In the same clearance and without receiving a proper read back, the controller instructed the pilot to report the cancellation of his instrument flight plan and change radio frequencies to the LBF common traffic advisory frequency. After a position change with controllers, the relieving controller reported the airplane overdue, and an alert notice (ALNOT) was issued.

A review of the ADS-B data revealed that during the last minute of data, the airplane’s vertical descent rate increased from 500 ft per minute to 3,000 ft per minute. In the last 30 seconds, the vertical rate increased to a climb of 2,000 ft per minute, and then sharply decreased to a left descending turn exceeding 5,000 ft per minute. The last data point was located about 1,000 ft west-northwest of the accident site (see Figures 1 and 2).

Figure 1. ADS-B flight track view looking east-southeast.

Figure 2. ADS-B flight track view looking west-northwest.

About 3 miles southeast of LBF, a resident noticed smoke coming from a field and contacted the local fire department. Local authorities responded to the area and reported the airplane accident. There were no witnesses to the accident. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONA flight instructor who recently provided instruction to the pilot reported that the pilot had purchased the airplane about 3 weeks before the accident. Between October 23, 2022, and October 28, 2022, the instructor and the pilot completed 10 hours of ground instruction and 15.1 hours of flight instruction in the accident airplane. The instructor gave the pilot a low average score at the completion of the training. Between the completion of the training and the accident the pilot had logged 9.4 hours in the accident airplane.

The pilot’s logbook, which was in the main wreckage, revealed that the pilot had accumulated 505.3 total flight hours, of which 24.5 hours were in the accident airplane. Of the 505.3 hours, the pilot logged 5.2 hours of actual instrument flight time, of which 1.0 hour was in the accident airplane. The instructor reported the 1.0 hour of actual instrument time in the accident airplane was an encounter with IFR conditions during high-altitude training. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe accident airplane was equipped with avionics that included a Meggitt Magic six-screen electronic flight display, a Bendix KMD 850 multi-function display, Meggitt Magic 1500 autopilot/flight director, and a Garmin GNS 430W GPS/WAAS navigation system.

The flight instructor noted some discrepancies with the avionics components when he was completing his training with the accident pilot, including coupling an area navigation (RNAV) approach with the autopilot. The accident pilot had planned to complete an avionics upgrade scheduled for January 2023. The instructor recommended the pilot fly only ground-based approaches until the upgraded system was installed. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONThe accident pilot obtained a preflight weather briefing and filed an IFR flight plan at 0604, with an estimated departure of 0730 for a direct route to LBF at a planned altitude of 16,000 ft msl, with an alternate airport of Lexington, Nebraska. The standard route briefing provided the current hazards as a G-AIRMET for IFR and LLWS conditions extending over the route and accident site. The freezing level was noted between 8,000 and 12,000 ft msl over the route, with no icing expected below 16,000 ft msl. The briefing included Meteorological Aerodrome Report (METARs) for LBF and for other airports along the route from 0353 and 0553, and the TAF issued for LBF at 0832.

The initial TAF for LBF, issued at 0538 and used by the pilot in his preflight weather briefing indicated that MVFR conditions were expected to prevail through 1200 with north-northwesterly winds. After 1200, VFR conditions were expected to prevail with southerly winds gusting to 28 kts. The forecast did not include any forecast for LLWS. The TAF was amended at 0800 with LIFR conditions expected to prevail with an overcast ceiling at 300 ft agl through 1200.

A review of the ASOS observations for LBF indicated that a cold front moved through the area after 0100 and was followed by MVFR ceilings lowering conditions to IFR at 0624, which was after the pilot obtained a preflight weather briefing. At the time of the briefing, LBF was reporting MVFR conditions with the TAF in agreement, with MVFR expected to prevail during the planned flight. LIFR conditions were reported about 40 minutes before the flight’s departure from LNK at 0832 and continued through the time of the accident. Light freezing precipitation was reported intermittently before and after the accident, which was not included in the TAF or other graphic forecasts. The surface temperatures had dropped below freezing 3 hours before the accident and had been above freezing during the night and into the early morning hours, and thus the ground was not frozen and retained some residual heat. The LBF ASOS reported LIFR conditions with overcast ceilings at 300 ft agl and light freezing drizzle at the time of the accident due to below freezing temperatures at the surface.

The High-Resolution Rapid Refresh (HRRR) sounding for 0900 was plotted using the Universal Rawinsonde Observation (RAOB) analysis program. The program indicated a high potential for moderate or greater turbulence between 3,600 and 5,500 ft msl in the inversion where the sounding identified strong wind shear. The National Weather Service (NWS) did not have any current advisories for turbulence and had a G-AIRMET current for LLWS with a 20 kt change in wind speed within 2,000 ft of the surface.

The NWS Graphic Forecast for Aviation (GFA) provides a forecast for the en route phase of flight and for locations without a TAF. The GFA 6-hour forecast issued about 0400 and available at the time of the pilot’s preflight briefing depicted easterly winds at 10 to 15 kts over the region with visibility unrestricted, while a G-AIRMET for IFR conditions extended over the area. The GFA cloud forecast depicted overcast clouds with bases at 3,500 ft msl and tops between 7,000 and 8,000 ft msl.

The NWS AWC CIP about 0600 depicted the potential for light icing over extreme northwest Nebraska and a trace of ice immediately north of the accident site with little to no supercooled large droplets (SLD) expected over the accident site. The NWS AWC 3-hour FIP depicted no icing conditions over the accident site.

During the time period surrounding the accident, the NWS had no SIGMETs, Convective SIGMETs, or Center Weather Advisories (CWA’s) current for the area. The NWS did have G-AIRMETs current for IFR conditions and LLWS below 2,000 ft agl. There were no G-AIRMETs current for icing over the route of flight.

A pilot operating a Cessna 208 for a regional freight carrier from Omaha, Nebraska, to LBF, was following the accident airplane on the instrument approach. The pilot recalled the LBF weather being reported as a ceiling near 200 ft with visibility 1 to 2 miles with occasional freezing rain. He indicated the cloud tops were between 7,500 ft to 7,900 ft with cumulus type clouds and anticipated a turbulent approach with potential icing and a tailwind landing on runway 30. The pilot categorized the approach as “very demanding.” After the accident airplane could not be accounted for in front of him, the pilot made two loops in a holding pattern and then diverted to another airport to the south due to reported light freezing precipitation. The pilot reported that the TAFs he received were somewhat behind the actual reported weather conditions and did not reflect the actual conditions until after 1200. He indicated he thought the front had moved through faster than expected. AIRPORT INFORMATIONThe accident airplane was equipped with avionics that included a Meggitt Magic six-screen electronic flight display, a Bendix KMD 850 multi-function display, Meggitt Magic 1500 autopilot/flight director, and a Garmin GNS 430W GPS/WAAS navigation system.

The flight instructor noted some discrepancies with the avionics components when he was completing his training with the accident pilot, including coupling an area navigation (RNAV) approach with the autopilot. The accident pilot had planned to complete an avionics upgrade scheduled for January 2023. The instructor recommended the pilot fly only ground-based approaches until the upgraded system was installed. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONPostaccident examination of the accident site revealed the airplane impacted terrain on the bank of an irrigation reservoir. A postimpact fire partially consumed the airplane. The main wreckage, which consisted of the engine, fuselage, and empennage, came to rest within the initial impact area. Fragmented airplane structure was located within a 50 ft diameter of the main w...

Data Source

Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# CEN23FA031