N7295Y

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn November 19, 2022, about 1110 eastern standard time, a Piper PA-30, N7295Y, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Smith Reynolds Airport (INT), Winston-Salem, North Carolina. The commercial pilot and passenger were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

According to automatic dependent surveillance – broadcast (ADS-B) data, earlier that day the pilot and passenger flew from St. Louis Downtown Airport (CPS), Cahokia, Illinois, to London (Corbin) Magee Airport (LOZ), London, Kentucky, where a go-around was performed followed by an uneventful landing. After landing, the pilot reported an electrical system issue, but no maintenance was requested or performed.

According to ADS-B data and air traffic control radio communication information, the airplane departed LOZ about 1004, and headed east-southeast towards INT, while air traffic control communications were transferred to several facilities appropriate for the route of flight. At 1103:39, while west-northwest of INT, air traffic control communications were transferred to INT air traffic control tower (ATCT).

The pilot established contact with the INT ATCT at 1104:07, and at that time the airplane was flying at 3,450 ft pressure altitude about 8.3 nautical miles west-northwest from INT. The airplane continued on an east-southeast ground track while descending, and then at 1104:40, the local controller instructed the pilot to enter left base for runway 4. The pilot incorrectly read back the instruction, which the controller corrected, and then the pilot correctly read back the runway. At 1105:05, the pilot reported on the frequency, “that engines not ah” with the rest of the comment unfinished. The airplane turned slightly to the right flying on a southeast ground track consistent with the base leg of the airport traffic pattern for runway 4. Then, at 1106:02, when the airplane was at about 2,175 ft pressure altitude and about 4 nautical miles nearly due west from the approach end of runway 4, the pilot informed the controller, “…I got one engine that’s not making as much power as the other one we’re ok….” The controller responded by telling the pilot that he was on left base for runway 4. The airplane continued on the southeast ground track until 1106:26, and then turned left flying in an easterly direction. At 1108:05, when the airplane was east of the extended runway 4 centerline at 1,050 ft pressure altitude, the pilot asked the controller if he could land on runway 33, which was approved. The airplane continued on an east or east-southeast heading while descending. At 1109:08, when the airplane was about 4,300 ft west of the extended runway 33 centerline, the pilot asked if he could perform a right 360° turn, which was his last communication. The controller approved the pilot’s request and cleared the pilot to land runway 33.

The airplane continued in an easterly direction flying east of the extended runway 33 centerline, and then turned left on northwesterly heading flying parallel to the runway. Between 1110:23 and 1110:27, which was the last ADS-B target, the flight path turned right about 20°. The accident site was located about 210 ft north-northeast from the last ADS-B target location, consistent with the turn to the right.

A witness reported that the airplane, while flying in an easterly direction, banked left at about a 45° bank angle. He noted the airplane then rolled to nearly wings level but then maintained a slight left bank of about 10°. He reported hearing the engines “roaring as hard as they can go” or at full power, while flying in a nose-up attitude just above the trees. The airplane then rolled left to an inverted position and descended straight down. He did not see any smoke trailing the airplane and reported that the landing gear was extended. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONIn accordance with Airworthiness Directive (AD) 69-24-04, the airplane’s single-engine minimum control speed (Vmc) was changed from about 80 MPH calibrated airspeed (CAS) to 90 MPH CAS. The AD referenced Piper Service Bulletin 301A dated November 25, 1969.

The airplane was equipped with two Garmin G5 electronic flight instruments. At the time of the accident neither unit had a memory card installed; thus, no data was available.

Each engine was equipped with a single acting, constant speed, manual feathering, two-bladed Hartzell propeller. Each propeller was controlled by oil pressure from the engine-driven propeller governor that was commanded via cable by the propeller control lever on the throttle quadrant. Movement of the propeller control to the low pitch/high rpm position allowed oil pressure from the propeller governor to move the blades to low pitch/high rpm. Movement of the propeller control to the feather position diverted engine oil from the governor to the engine allowing the feathering springs and air charge to move the blades to the feather position.

To prevent feathering during normal engine shutdown on the ground, the propeller incorporated spring-energized latches, or start locks. If propeller rotation was approximately 800 RPM or above, the latches were disengaged by centrifugal force, which compressed the springs. When engine RPM dropped below 800 RPM (and blade angle was typically within 7° of the low pitch stop), the springs would overcome the latch weight centrifugal force and move the latches to engage the high pitch stops, preventing blade angle movement to feather during normal engine shutdown. Following a partial loss of engine power that does not cause loss of oil pressure, if the propeller was not feathered and the engine rpm were allowed to fall below about 800 rpm, the start locks would engage and prevent the propeller from feathering if the propeller control was moved to the feather position.

According to the emergency procedures contained within the airplane Owner’s Handbook, if an engine failure occurs during cruise flight, it specified to maintain airspeed and directional control. The section indicated that if the specified troubleshooting did not restore power, the propeller on the inoperative engine should be feathered. The section also indicated that best single-engine performance would be obtained by banking 3° to 5° into the operational engine and that rudder trim may be used as necessary for single-engine flight.

In March 2004, the accident airplane was modified by installation of vortex generators on each wing leading edge and both sides of the vertical stabilizer in accordance with Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) SA00763SE. According to the president of the STC holder, there was no change to the published velocity air minimum control speed, thus no change in performance.

Review of the maintenance records revealed the right engine fuel servo was overhauled and then installed on the right engine in April 2000. The right engine was subsequently removed from the airframe for overhaul, which was signed off in November 2001. According to the invoice/work order associated with the engine overhaul, there was no record that the right fuel servo was overhauled or repaired at that time. No record of FAA Form 8130-3 or serviceable tag for the right fuel servo was located. At the time of the last annual inspection about 6 months before the accident, the right fuel servo, which is considered an on-condition component, had accumulated about 1,035 hours and 23 years since last overhaul.

The airplane was last fueled at LOZ with 29.4 gallons of 100 low lead (100LL) fuel; the fuel supplier “Incident/Accident Form” specified that since the last truck top off, there were 25 aircraft fueled from the same vehicle. Sixteen were fueled before the accident airplane and eight were fueled after. Although no fuel testing was performed, there were no reported fuel-related issues. AIRPORT INFORMATIONIn accordance with Airworthiness Directive (AD) 69-24-04, the airplane’s single-engine minimum control speed (Vmc) was changed from about 80 MPH calibrated airspeed (CAS) to 90 MPH CAS. The AD referenced Piper Service Bulletin 301A dated November 25, 1969.

The airplane was equipped with two Garmin G5 electronic flight instruments. At the time of the accident neither unit had a memory card installed; thus, no data was available.

Each engine was equipped with a single acting, constant speed, manual feathering, two-bladed Hartzell propeller. Each propeller was controlled by oil pressure from the engine-driven propeller governor that was commanded via cable by the propeller control lever on the throttle quadrant. Movement of the propeller control to the low pitch/high rpm position allowed oil pressure from the propeller governor to move the blades to low pitch/high rpm. Movement of the propeller control to the feather position diverted engine oil from the governor to the engine allowing the feathering springs and air charge to move the blades to the feather position.

To prevent feathering during normal engine shutdown on the ground, the propeller incorporated spring-energized latches, or start locks. If propeller rotation was approximately 800 RPM or above, the latches were disengaged by centrifugal force, which compressed the springs. When engine RPM dropped below 800 RPM (and blade angle was typically within 7° of the low pitch stop), the springs would overcome the latch weight centrifugal force and move the latches to engage the high pitch stops, preventing blade angle movement to feather during normal engine shutdown. Following a partial loss of engine power that does not cause loss of oil pressure, if the propeller was not feathered and the engine rpm were allowed to fall below about 800 rpm, the start locks would engage and prevent the propeller from feathering if the propeller control was moved to the feather position.

According to the emergency procedures contained within the airplane Owner’s Handbook, if an engine failure occurs du...