N311MH

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn July 20, 2023, about 1105 Alaska daylight time, a Bell 206L-4 helicopter, N311MH, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Wainwright, Alaska. The pilot and three passengers were fatally injured. The helicopter was operated by the pilot as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 135 on-demand charter flight.

The helicopter was owned and operated by Maritime Helicopters and was under an exclusive use contract to the State of Alaska’s Department of Natural Resources (DNR), being used to transport scientific crews to various remote locations within the North Slope region.

Maritime Helicopters’ Director of Operations reported that the accident helicopter and DNR crew members were based in Utqiagvik (formerly Barrow), Alaska, for the duration of the contract. He added that when the accident helicopter departed from Utqiagvik, about 1001, the anticipated route included a brief stop at the Atqasuk Airport, Atqasuk, Alaska, and then continuing to remote sites to the east of Wainwright, before ultimately returning to Utqiagvik. The accident helicopter was expected to return to Utqiagvik by 2030. When the helicopter did not arrive back in Utqiagvik, a North Slope Borough (NSB) Search and Rescue Sikorsky S-92 helicopter was dispatched to search for the missing helicopter.

The partially submerged, fragmented helicopter wreckage was found in the shallow waters of Lake Itinik, about 30 miles east of Wainwright. Lake Itinik is a large, oval shaped, arctic lake, measuring more than three miles across in some areas. The terrain around Lake Itinik consists of flat, featureless, arctic tundra-covered terrain. The elevation of Lake Itinik is about 56 ft above mean sea level (msl).

The accident helicopter was equipped with a Honeywell Sky Connect Tracker system enabling real-time flight following capabilities. The Sky Connect Tracker system broadcasts flight status data in 3-minute intervals to satellite-based receivers. Management personnel from Maritime Helicopters, as well as personnel from DNR had real-time flight following capabilities of the accident helicopter.

A review of the archived Sky Connect data revealed that the accident helicopter departed from Utqiagvik about 1001; it then proceeded southwest to the Atqasuk Airport. After a brief stop at the Atqasuk Airport, the helicopter departed and traveled in a northwesterly direction. At 1105, the Sky Connect data ends as the helicopter passed over the southeastern shoreline of Lake Itinik, while continuing to travel in a northwesterly direction, at an altitude of 144 ft msl with a ground speed of 93 knots.

At about 1112 the Sky Connect system sent out an overdue aircraft report, but that report went unnoticed by the operator or the DNR. The helicopter was reported overdue at 2230 by an employee of the State of Alaska Geological Survey.

On a flight the day before the accident, Sky Connect Tracker system flight data revealed an average altitude of about 200 ft msl with an average airspeed of about 105 knots.

A helicopter pilot operating in the same area said, in general, if there is poor flying weather, he will fly around 800 to 1,200 ft msl. With no weather restrictions, he will fly between 3,000 and 4,000 ft msl. When asked about the speed and altitude of the accident helicopter was flying at, he said based on his experience in that area that was “too fast” at those altitudes. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe accident pilot recently retired from the military; this was his first job as a pilot since retirement. He had about 1,900 hours of flight experience in helicopters. He started with the company in October of 2022. Initially he was assigned to the Bell 407 helicopter, but six months before the accident he transitioned to the Bell 206 series helicopter. As part of his initial training, the pilot completed an exam on flat-light conditions on October 21, 2022. On a follow up exam, the pilot identified the North Slope as an area conducive to flat light conditions. The pilot arrived in Utqiagvik two days before the accident flight. The accident flight was his second flight with passengers in the Utqiagvik area. According to the operator, flat light flight procedures are covered in their training program, and overwater flight procedures are covered in their Standard Operating Procedures (SOP’s). AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe operator’s SOP’s state that helicopters will not be operated in areas of flat featureless terrain unless the in-flight visibility is at least one mile, a visual surface reference is available which would allow for a safe landing area, and a visible horizon is present that distinguishes the sky and ground. According to the SOP’s, flat light conditions can be present in a variety of areas ranging from snow-covered terrain to over open water.

Flat light is a visual condition where sunlight is diffused by, but not limited to, overcast skies, coupled with flat and featureless terrain, calm water, or snow-covered terrain. Flat light conditions in these environments contribute to the pilot’s ability to discern topographical features below making it difficult to determine the altitude and/or attitude of the aircraft. One of the hazards associated with overwater operations identified by the operator in their SOP’s is controlled flight into terrain.

The operator’s SOP’s also require only float equipped aircraft (fixed or emergency pop-out floats) to be operated beyond power-off gliding distance from shore. The accident helicopter was not equipped with fixed or emergency pop-out floats.

Title 14 CFR §135.207 helicopter surface reference requirements. No person may operate a helicopter under VFR unless that person has visual surface reference or, at night, visual surface light reference, sufficient to safely control the helicopter.

The operator’s flight locating procedures shall be provided by:

A local Flight Service Station, through the use of a filed FAA flight plan including Company phone contact; or, a designated company or customer flight monitor through the use of a Company VFR flight plan. These flight locating procedures will be immediately available to the designated flight monitor.

In the event a company aircraft operating on a company flight plan is more than 60 minutes overdue from the latest ETA, or if an emergency signal is indicated by the aircraft flight following system. The following steps shall be taken by the designated flight monitor.

1. Attempt to contact the aircraft.

2. Contact other company aircraft, company personnel at the remote site, the customer or any other operators in the surrounding area and ask them to try to contact the overdue aircraft through their available communication methods.

3. Call the closest Flight Service Station, identify the flight and request any information and possible FSS contact.

4. Notify company management. Identify the aircraft and its location on the Sky Connect Tracker computer display, and explain any pertinent information about the flight.

5. If the aircraft has not been located after accomplishing steps 1 through 4 call NTSB and the FAA 24-hour response phone number to report the flight overdue.

The operator reported that the accident pilot did not receive the information concerning the altitude flight restrictions that were required by the Alaska DNR permit.

The operator does not have a Flight Operational Quality Assurance program and does not review flight history to detect unsafe behaviors.

A chief at the Alaska DNR who had extensive knowledge of the requirements of the permit to operate in the area, was familiar with the mission the crew was conducting, and who had flown numerous times in the area reported that helicopter pilots would fly a lot higher than the minimum altitude and would only go lower because of the weather as stipulated in the permit.

The Director of Operations for the operator said “they fly as high as they can and avoids flying over water in poor weather conditions.” The only time they fly low is because of poor weather. He was not sure why the pilot would choose to fly so low and at that speed.

The operator requires their pilots to comply with FAA altitude minimums, to include 14 CFR §91.119, 14 CFR §135.203 and 14 CFR §135.207. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONWhen the accident helicopter departed PABR, which was about 55 miles from the accident site at an elevation of 49 ft, the ceiling was about 200 to 300 ft agl and visibility was about 3 to 5 statute miles.

The closest weather reporting location to the accident site was Atqasuk Edward Burnell Sr. Memorial Airport (PATQ), located about 27 miles southeast of the accident site at an elevation of 101 ft. The weather conditions were light winds, visibility was 10 miles or more, and sky conditions were clear. About 5 minutes after the accident the visibility was reported as 5 miles and haze. These conditions were present for about 15 minutes and then returned to 10 miles or more.

PATQ weather at 1105 AKDT, automated, wind from 290° at 3 knots, visibility 10 miles or more, sky clear below 12,000 ft, temperature 18° C, dew point 14° C, altimeter 29.90 inHg. PATQ weather at 1110 AKDT, automated, wind from 240° at 5 knots, visibility 5 miles in haze, sky clear below 12,000 ft, temperature 18° C, dew point 14° C, altimeter 29.90 inHg.

The next closest reporting location was from Wainwright Airport (PAWI), Wainwright, Alaska, located 36 miles west of the accident site at an elevation of 45 ft. The weather conditions about the time of the accident were reported as visibility 9 miles, sky clear below 12,000 ft agl.

Satellite imagery of the accident site revealed the presence of low stratiform clouds that extended from PABR and ended near PATQ. The Fog Stability Index indicated favorable conditions for the formation of radiation type fog.

Due to fiber optic outages, there were a limited number of FAA weather camera images available. There were no images from the closest weather camera (PATQ) facing the ...