N4037S

MINR
Fatal

SIKORSKY S-64ES/N: 64101

Accident Details

Date
Monday, August 7, 2023
NTSB Number
WPR23FA302
Location
Cabazon, CA
Event ID
20230807192807
Coordinates
33.914300, -116.806700
Aircraft Damage
MINR
Highest Injury
Fatal
Fatalities
3
Serious Injuries
0
Minor Injuries
0
Uninjured
2
Total Aboard
5

Probable Cause and Findings

The Skycrane flight crew’s decision to enter the Fire Traffic Area’s 7-nm NOCOM ring at an altitude significantly above their maximum cleared altitude, which resulted in their need for an aggressive descent into congested airspace and subsequent failure to see and avoid the Bell 407.

Aircraft Information

Registration
Make
SIKORSKY
Serial Number
64101
Engine Type
Turbo-shaft
Year Built
1975
Model / ICAO
S-64ES64
Aircraft Type
Rotorcraft
No. of Engines
2
Seats
3
FAA Model
S-64E

Registered Owner (Current)

Name
SILLER HELICOPTERS LLC
Address
2025 FLIGHTWAY DR
City
CHAMBLEE
State / Zip Code
GA 30341-3349
Country
United States

Analysis

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn August 6, 2023, about 1844 Pacific daylight time, a Bell 407, N555AS, and a Sikorsky S-64, N4037S, collided mid-air near Cabazon, California. The Bell was destroyed and the pilot and two qualified non-crewmembers were fatally injured. The Sikorsky sustained minor damage and the pilot and copilot were not injured. Both helicopters were operated as public-use firefighting aircraft.

Before their respective flights, each flight crew was briefed on their mission. The Bell 407 was tasked as a Helicopter Coordinator (HLCO) training flight while the Sikorsky Skycrane was dispatched to support fire operations. The Skycrane received their dispatch instructions about 15 minutes before their departure.

Review of the communication recording from within the Skycrane shows that the recording started at 0:00 lapse time (refer to figure 1).

Figure 1. Recorded ADS-B data with select communications annotated.

At 01:18, the Bell 407 made a call to Hemet Base Victor Dispatch (Hemet Tower) requesting a bearing and distance to the fire. ADS-B data revealed that the Bell 407 departed from HMT about 1834 (02:37) and traveled north-northeast for about 2 nm then maneuvered to the north. HMT was about 3.5 miles from the edge of the FTA’s 12-nm Initial Communication Ring.

The ADS-B flight track of the Bell 407 could not be correlated with the positioning of the Skyrcrane, which was based on CVR audio.

At 04:17, the Skycrane PIC initiated a 10-sec conversation with the SIC stating the Bell 407 was “going too” [to support the incident] and was either an HLCO or a training platform. The Skycrane crew continued their checklist; at 06:14, the crew simultaneously made separate radio calls and the PIC transmitted on the Hemet Common Traffic Advisory Frequency and the SIC contacted Hemet Tower of their impending departure. ADS-B data showed that the Skycrane departed HMT about 3 minutes after the Bell; the Skycrane maneuvered to the northeast and, at 07:25, crossed a solar farm about 0.5 nm northeast of HMT.

At 08:41, the Skycrane crew started an internal discussion that the first preferred call into the fire incident should be on the Air Tactics frequency. At 09:46, a broadcast from ATGS can be heard providing instructions for a tanker fire drop. At 10:47, in an internal conversation, the SIC told the PIC that they were about 10 nm from Cabazon. ADS-B data showed that the Skycrane was about 2,650 ft msl.

At 11:23, the Bell 407, while in a left circling maneuver, reported to ATGS that they were 8 miles west of the fire at 4,300 ft msl. At 11:28, ATGS provided an altimeter setting of 29.96 and cleared the Bell 407 into the FTA with a maximum altitude of 2,500 ft msl. ATGS also informed the Bell 407 that ATGS was at 4,500 ft, with one tanker at 3,500 ft, and that there were multiple hazards. ADS-B showed that the Bell 407 initiated a steep descent to meet the 2,500 ft maximum altitude restriction and leveled off to about 2,500 ft about 2 miles inside the 7 nm (NOCOM) ring.

At 11:42, the Skycrane PIC requested their clearance into the FTA on the ATGS frequency, stating, “Cabazon Air Attack, helitanker 37S checking in just inside 7 miles, err, uh, eight miles, rather.” At 11:56, the SIC broadcasted on a Victor frequency, “Cabazon Air Attack helitanker 37S, 7 miles south inbound.” At 12:08, the Skycrane SIC stated to the PIC that they tried to get their clearance from ATGS.

At 12:33, ATGS broadcasted the Skycrane’s clearance into the FTA, stating, “and 37S altimeter 29.96, you are cleared in 2,500 [ft] and below, air attack [ATGS] is at 4,500, one tanker at 3,500 [ft], and you have multiple hazards in the area. I [ATGS] will orient you when you get on the scene.” At 12:37, the Skycrane SIC points to the left, and the time on his watch read 18:34 local; the PIC initiated a left turn at 4,000 ft. ADS-B data showed that they were 6 nm from the fire incident and a mile into the FTA. At 12:45, the Skycrane acknowledged their clearance into the FTA. At 13:10, the Skycrane’s altimeter needle is seen climbing through 4,150 ft. About 13:23, the altimeter read 4,200 ft and the heading was 020°. About 13:34, the altimeter read 4,300 ft with the same heading. At 13:41, the altimeter read 4,200 ft. At 13:48, ATGS contacted the Bell 407 and the Skycrane. At 13:49, the Skycrane initiated a descent at 1,000 fpm, through 4,100 ft. At 13:53, the Skycrane had a descent rate of 2,500 fpm and the altitude was crossing 4,000 ft. At 13:57, the Skycrane had a descent rate of 2,800 fpm and was crossing 3,900 ft. Also, at 13:53 and 13:57, respectively, the Skycrane and Bell 407 both acknowledged ATGS’s request for their attention to receive further instruction. This is the last transmission recording heard from the Bell 407.

At 13:58, ATGS responded back to both helicopters and stated, “Ok, you have high tension power lines just south of the incident paralyzing…paralleling in front of the road and you got windmills off the east, those’ll be your hazards.” At 14:11, the Skycrane acknowledged ATGS and simultaneously descended at 3,000 fpm through 3,550 ft msl. At 14:22, the Skycrane continued its descent at 2,900 fpm through 3,350 ft. At 14:50, the Skycrane initiated a descending right turn at 2,000 fpm passing through 3,000 ft at 95 knots indicated. At 15:03, the Skycrane crew scanned the instrument gauges and configured the water tanks. At 15:06, the Skycrane continued its descent at 2,000 fpm, through 2,600 ft, at 100 knots. At 15:16, the Skycrane descended at 1,800 fpm through 2,550 ft at 100 knots. At 15:20, the Skycrane descended at 1,500 fpm through 2,500 ft at 100 knots. At 15:23, the Skycrane descended at 1,500 fpm through 2,450 ft at 100 knots. The recording showed that the right side collective control moved down, up, and then down again while the cyclic moved right and aft, before it swung back to a neutral position. Immediately after, the SIC asked, “oh …what was that?” At 15:25, the PIC asked if the Bell 407 struck the Skycrane, which the SIC confirmed. ADS-B data showed that Skycrane was on a descending right turn to the east while the Bell 407 was in level flight headed southeast. Both helicopters converged over descending terrain on the way to the fire. At 15:42, the Skycrane crew decided to initiate a precautionary landing onto a nearby field, where they landed without further incident. See figure 2.

Figure 2. ADS-B data during later part of flight with select communications annotated.

Surveillance footage retrieved from a building-mounted camera about 1.5 nm miles from the accident showed that the Bell 407 was in a level flight attitude and that the Skycrane was in a descent when both helicopters collided. The tail boom, main rotor, mast, and gearbox separated after the impact. The remaining fuselage followed the Bell 407's flightpath until it hit terrain. The Skycrane landed without further incident. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONSkycrane Pilot in command (PIC)

Siller Helicopters, Inc. hired the PIC in April, 2017. The pilot’s last flight review was completed on April 27, 2023. His last proficiency check for currency under CAL FIRE contract rules (pilot carding) was completed on May, 3, 2023, by the United States Forest Service (USFS).

Skycrane Second in command (SIC)

Siller Helicopters, Inc. hired the SIC in June, 2023. The pilot’s last flight review was completed on April 27, 2023. His last proficiency check for currency under CAL FIRE contract rules (pilot carding) was completed on June 24, 2023, by the USFS.

Bell 407 PIC

Air Shasta Rotor & Wing Inc. hired the PIC in February, 2018. The pilot’s last flight review was completed on April 27, 2023. His last proficiency check for currency under CAL FIRE contract rules (pilot carding) was completed on June 20, 2023, by the USFS. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONA postaccident examination of the Sikorsky tire revealed that the right main landing gear tire had about a 24-inch-wide cut; however, the cut section of the rubber tire was not located. A rubber transfer mark was found on a 12-inch section on the leading edge of the Bell 407’s main rotor blade. See figure 3.

Figure 3. Left photo - view of damaged tire on helicopter. Upper right photo - view of removed damaged tire. Lower right photo - view of damaged tire next to main rotor blade showing transfer mark.

Examination of the accident site revealed that the Bell 407 came to rest on a steep and rocky hillside about 1,050 ft from the last recorded ADS-B data point. See figure 4.

Figure 4. ADS-B flight plots with wreckage location markers.

A post-crash fire ensued after impact and consumed the fuselage of the Bell 407. The debris path was about 950 ft by 550 ft and contained all major components of the helicopter. The beginning of the debris path was identified by a piece of main rotor blade, which was about 560 feet east of the approximate collision area. Subsequent fragments of the main rotor blade were identified within a 100 ft span to the east. A displaced skid and crosstube came to rest about 195 ft east of the main wreckage and were the easternmost pieces of debris. About 830 ft southeast of the first blade component, a ground scar was consistent with the fuselage's first identified point of contact (FIPC). It was followed by a 20-foot-long ground scar, oriented on a 098° magnetic heading, that extended to the engine, which was displaced and located adjacent to rock boulders. See figure 5.

Figure 5. View of main wreckage.

The main wreckage was found about 45 ft east of the engine. The main rotor blades, mast, and transmission came to rest about 285 ft northwest of the main wreckage, upslope from the FIPC. The tail cone and tail rotor blade assembly came to rest about 470 ft west of the main wreckage. See figure 6.

Figure 6. Left photo - view of main rotor and transmission assembly. Right photo - view of separated tail boom.

A postaccident examination of the Bell 407’s airframe did not reveal any pre-impact anomalies. Flight c...

Data Source

Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# WPR23FA302