Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The takeoff by the flight crew of N269AA, without a takeoff clearance, which resulted in a collision with N510HM that was landing on an intersecting runway. Contributing to the accident was the N269AA crew’s expectation bias and distraction.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Historical)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn October 24, 2023, about 15:20 central daylight time, a Raytheon Hawker 850XP, N269AA, was taking off on runway 22 when its left wing collided with the vertical stabilizer of a Textron Aviation (Cessna) Citation Mustang, N510HM, which was landing on runway 13R at William P. Hobby Airport (HOU), Houston, Texas. Day visual meteorological conditions prevailed at the time of the accident.
There were no injuries to the two pilots and one passenger aboard N269AA or to the one pilot and three passengers aboard N510HM. N269AA sustained minor damage and N510HM was substantially damaged during the collision. N269AA was operating as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 135 on-demand passenger flight from HOU to Waukesha County Airport (UES), Waukesha, Wisconsin. N510HM was operating as a Title 14 CFR Part 91 flight from Fulton County Executive Airport/Charlie Brown Field (FTY), Atlanta, Georgia, to HOU.
HOU has intersecting runways, and at the time of the accident N510HM was rolling out after landing on runway 13R, while N269AA was on its takeoff roll on runway 22. See figure 1.
Figure 1. View of both airplanes’ flight tracks with the area the ground collision occurred highlighted in yellow. The blue line represents the N510HM flight track, and the red line represents the N269AA flight track.
A review of certified air traffic control voice recordings provided by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) revealed that at 1514:09, before N269AA began its taxi, the flight crew contacted ground control (GC) to request clearance to taxi for departure, which they received.
About a minute later, the pilot of N510HM checked in with local control (LC) controller while on a nine-mile final to runway 13R. The LC controller then cleared the pilot of N510HM to land.
At 15:15:15, N269AA taxied northeast on parallel taxiway K (Kilo) and approached runway 22 for departure. At 1515:50 the GC controller instructed the crew of N269AA to monitor the LC frequency. The flight crew stated in their post-accident interview that as they passed taxiway “K2” during their taxi to runway 22, they switched to the LC frequency.
At 1517:32 the pilot of N510HM reported a four-mile final.
At 1518:01 the LC controller instructed the crew of N269AA to line up and wait (LUAW) on runway 22, however the LC controller did not provide a traffic advisory to either airplane regarding the other, as required. The pilot monitoring (PM) replied with “line up and wait uh, two two uh, six nine Alpha Alpha” at 1518:04. The PM recalled that about the same time, they noticed that the V-speeds were no longer depicted on the display screens. They had a discussion about this, and the PM began reentering some of the data into the flight management system.
The pilot flying (PF) recalled that he felt “a little bit rushed” due to what he believed was a takeoff clearance and he did not want to delay too long on the runway. He said the crew discussed the speeds and knew what they should be, so they elected to go. The PF recalled hearing only a clearance for takeoff, while the PM recalled hearing the LUAW clearance followed by a clearance for takeoff. Both pilots recalled hearing the clearance for takeoff about the time they began the left turn toward the runway at the end of taxiway Kilo. See figure 2 below.
Figure 2. Taxiways K (Kilo) and K2 (Kilo 2) at the departure end of runway 22.
According to the air traffic control voice recordings, no takeoff clearance was issued near that time to N269AA or to any other airplanes. N296AA entered runway 22, and subsequently began their departure roll, without authorization from the LC controller.
About 1518:29, N510HM was on an approximate one and a half mile final for runway 13R. As N269AA began the takeoff roll, the (PF) felt some right rudder input, and mentioned it to the PM. The PM explained that it was the rudder bias system, and advised that if the throttles were brought up, that it would clear itself. The PF reduced the throttles and then brought them back up slowly, and the rudder bias deactivated. The crew also observed an amber elevator trim annunciator light as the takeoff roll began. The PM adjusted the elevator trim wheel slightly, and the light extinguished.
N269AA was on the takeoff roll on runway 22, when the flight data/clearance delivery controller alerted the LC about N269AA’s movement, and at 1519:47 the local controller stated “nine alpha alpha, stop, hold your position.” There was no response from the crew of N269AA. At 1519:49, the automated airport surface detection equipment sounded an alarm warning of the impending collision. At 1519:52 the LC controller again stated, “alpha, alpha, hold your position, stop,” to which there was still no response.
At 1520:00, N269AA collided with N510HM. At 1520:14, the LC controller began providing instructions to send around all aircraft that were on final approach behind N510HM.
At 1520:29 the crew of N269AA, who had taken off and was in the initial climb, informed local control that they needed to return to the airport, and the LC controller provided vectors to return to the airport and land on runway 13R.
At 1521:08 the LC controller cleared N269AA to land on runway 13R, and the flight landed otherwise uneventfully.
In the post-accident interview, the N510HM pilot said that he did not see N269AA, but during the landing roll he heard a sound similar to a truck tire blowing out on a highway. He said that the airplane did not yaw, and the airplane had no controllability issues rolling down the runway or taxiing to the ramp. It wasn’t until the pilot got out of the airplane that he saw the damage to the airplane.
Both crew members in N269AA (the PF was in the left seat, and the PM was in the right seat) said that they did not see N510HM until about 1 second prior to impact and described the feeling of the impact as a “thud.” PERSONNEL INFORMATIONN510HM Pilot
The pilot, age 40, held a FAA Private Pilot certificate with ratings for Airplane Multi-engine Land, Airplane Single-Engine Land, Instrument Airplane, and type ratings in the CE-510 and CE-510S. He had a FAA Third Class medical certificate issued on May 3, 2023, with no restrictions or limitations. The pilot’s estimated flight hours were based on the information he provided during a post-accident interview. He estimated he had about 1,000 total hours of flight experience and about 300 of those hours were in the accident airplane make and model.
N269AA Crew
The PF was 69 years old and had a FAA Airline Transport Pilot certificate with ratings for Airplane Single- and Multi-engine Land, with type ratings for B-737, B-757, B-767, B-777, B-787, DC-9, and HS-125. Additionally, he had a Flight Engineer certificate with rating of Turbojet Powered and a Mechanic certificate with Airframe and Powerplant. He had a FAA First Class medical certificate issued on May 12, 2023, with limitations: Must use correct lens(es) to meet vision standards at all required dista[nces]. The PF’s estimated flight hours were based on interview, company and FAA records. His total flight experience was about 24,000 hours, of which about 300 were in the accident airplane make and model. He was seated in the left seat for the flight.
He had a temporary residence in Aurora, Illinois, about a 30-minute drive from the DuPage airport. He had been in Illinois since October 12 or 13th flying short trips lasting 2 or 3 days. On October 22, 2023, he flew a trip and arrived back to DuPage about 16:00. He arrived at his temporary residence close to 18:00, had dinner and was in bed between 20:00 and 21:00.
On October 23, the PF set his alarm for 03:30 because he had a 06:30 departure from DuPage. He felt rested that day. He took about an hour nap, went to the gym, had dinner, and then went to bed. His bedtime was unknown.
On October 24, he woke up about 08:30 and had breakfast at 09:00. He had an extended checkout and completed paperwork and training before the flight. He thought he dozed off while completing the training but felt rested for the flight. He did not recall if they took an Uber or shuttle to the airport.
He had no issues falling asleep or staying asleep and had never talked to his doctor about a sleep disorder. He thought he needed 7 hours of sleep on average per night to feel rested. He may sleep up to 10 hours when arriving back home in San Diego after flying.
The PM was also the pilot in command (PIC) for the flight. He was also a training captain for DuPage Aerospace. He was 67 years old and held an FAA Airline Transport Pilot Certificate with ratings for Airplane Single- and Multi-engine Land and type ratings of B-727, B-737, CE-500, DA-20, DC-9, G-200, HS-125, and LR-JET. Additionally, he held a Flight Engineer certificate with rating of turbojet powered. He held a First-Class medical certificate, dated September 26, 2023, with a limitation: Must use corrective lens(es) to meet vision standards at all required dista[nces]. According to his interview he had about 28,000 hours of total flight experience and approximately 3,800 hours of flight experience in the accident aircraft make and model. He was seated in the right seat for the flight.
He had flown a multi-day trip which ended on Saturday, October 21, 2023. He was off duty on Sunday, October 22. He did work around his house. He thought he went to bed about 21:00 and got a good night’s sleep.
On Monday, October 23, he had an early show, he thought 04:30, for a 06:30 departure from DuPage. He thought he woke up about 02:30 or 03:00. They flew to Waukesha, then to Houston, and then went to the hotel. He thought he may have napped sometime during the afternoon. He went to dinner and thought he returned to the hotel about 20:30 or 21:00. He went to bed after Monday Night Football ended.
On Tuesday, October 24, he woke up by 08:30 with his alarms, which were set for 08:00, 08:15 and 08:30, and went downstairs for a coffee and breakfast snack. He went ba...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# DCA24FA017