N22MW – EXTRA FLUGZEUGBAU GMBH EA 300/L – 2024-05-19 NTSB Accident Report

HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn May 19, 2024, at 1649 Pacific daylight time, an Extra Flugzeugbau GMBH EA 300/L airplane, N22MW, was substantially damaged when it was involved in an accident near Bandera, Washington. The pilot was fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.

The pilot was planning to attend an annual International Aerobatic Club (IAC) aerobatic training camp in Ephrata, Washington. The pilot recently had a mishap with his own airplane, an Extra NG, where it was damaged when the canopy opened during takeoff. Because the accident pilot’s airplane was in maintenance, the owner of the accident airplane offered to lend the pilot his airplane to use for the aerobatic camp. The pilot had flown the airplane before and was covered by the owner’s insurance.

A review of ADS-B data revealed that the airplane departed Arlington Municipal Airport (AWO), Arlington, Washington, about 1627. The airplane proceeded south-southeast until intersecting Interstate 90 near Snoqualmie, Washington. The airplane then began to follow I-90 through a mountain pass while generally maintaining an altitude of 1,500 ft agl (see figure 1). The canyon walls along the mountain pass reached up to 5,500 ft msl.

Figure 1. Flight path in reference to the destination airport

About 1647, the airplane entered a 1,500-feet-per-minute climb, with its groundspeed gradually decreasing from 170 kts to 130 kts over a 20-second period. At 1648, the airplane passed to the south of Bandera State Airport (4W0) after reaching an altitude of about 7,000 ft msl and an airspeed of 103 kts. The airplane began to descend and its speed increased to over 185 kts (see figure 2). The airplane leveled off briefly and then began another, steeper descent. During the final seconds of recorded data, the airplane began a 90° left turn and the airspeed decreased while it continued the descent. The last recorded data point was at 1649:06 and showed that the airplane was at 4,500 ft and 120 kts. When the airplane did not arrive at Ephrata, an alert notice was issued, and the wreckage was located the following morning near the final ADS-B position.

Figure 2. End of flight track PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land and glider. He held a BasicMed medical certificate issued on May 15, 2023, with the limitation that corrective lenses were required for distant vision and glasses must be available for near vision. He was associated with International Aerobatic Club Chapter 67 and was the waiver holder for the Ephrata aerobatic camp.

According to the pilot’s logbook, at the time of the accident he had accumulated 1,313.5 total hours of flight experience, 6 hours of which were accumulated in the 90 days before the accident. He had extensive aerobatic experience.

The pilot logbooks revealed that the pilot flew from Arlington to Ephrata through Stampede Pass on at least two occasions since October 2021. The routes he flew through the pass on those two occasions were similar to the route of the accident flight. The airplane owner stated that the pilot had flown the route from Arlington to Ephrata through the pass many times, typically following I-90.

It is unknown if the pilot was aware of the weather forecast conditions before departure. There is no record of the pilot reviewing weather information from either Leidos or ForeFlight. After making arrangements with the airplane’s owner the day before the accident to move the airplane to his own hangar, the pilot stated to the owner that the weather forecast was “iffy for getting to Stampede Pass,” so he would likely depart the day of the accident or possibly the next morning.

Aerobatic Camp

The pilot was scheduled to attend an aerobatic camp that started the day after the accident. This camp was structured for one group of pilots to participate for the first three days, followed by another group for the next three days. The first group of pilots were scheduled to land on the day of the accident to receive a briefing at 1600 and to sign in. The pilot indicated to the airplane’s owner that he planned to get up on the morning of the accident and wait for favorable weather, mentioning he might have to wait until May 22 or 23. His camp was scheduled to start on May 22. He told the camp’s organizers that his wife was driving to the airport with the FAA-required Certificate of Waiver (CoW) to be signed at the briefing. About 1450 on the day of the accident, one of the camp’s organizers asked the pilot if he would be at Ephrata that day to help give the briefing. The pilot responded that he would not make the briefing.

The aerobatics training camp required a CoW from the FAA, which was issued to the pilot. The CoW detailed the conditions and responsibilities under which the camp was allowed to conduct aerobatic flight activities in the designated area near the airport, including compliance with specific safety and operational provisions; it stipulated that failure to adhere to the conditions could result in the cancellation of the waiver and legal penalties. The CoW stated, “The holder of this certificate shall be responsible for the strict observance of the terms and provisions contained herein” and that the pilot was the only person “authorized to activate and deactivate” the aerobatic area; no other people were delegated this authority. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONReview of the airplane’s records revealed that the most recent annual inspection was completed on September 30, 2023, at an airframe total time of 1,002 hours. The most recent recorded maintenance was replacement of the tailwheel on May 15, 2024, at an airframe total time of 1,016.8 hours.

According to the airplane’s flight manual, the published stall speeds at a weight of 870 kg were 57 kts at wings level, 61 kts at 30° of bank, and 68 kts at 45° of bank.

The flight manual states that flight into known icing conditions is prohibited. It instructs the pilot to immediately exit icing conditions by turning back or changing altitude to reach an outside air temperature less conducive to ice accumulation. It further directs the pilot to plan to land at the nearest suitable airfield. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATIONThe closest official weather reporting station was Stampede Pass Airport (SMP), Stampede Pass, Washington, located about 9 miles southeast of the accident site at an elevation of 3,970 ft msl. The automated observation about 30 minutes before the accident reported wind from 250° at 4 kts, visibility 10 miles or greater, broken clouds at 1,500 ft agl, broken clouds at 2,300 ft agl, temperature 5°C, dew point 2°C, and an altimeter setting of 30.18 inches of mercury (inHg). The automated observation about 30 minutes after the accident reported variable wind at 5 kts, visibility 10 miles or greater, broken clouds at 1,700 ft agl, overcast clouds at 2,500 ft agl, temperature 5°C, dew point 2°C, and an altimeter setting of 30.18 inHg.

A High-Resolution Rapid Refresh model sounding for 1700 depicted the lifted condensation level and level of free convection at 4,273 ft msl and the convective condensation level at 5,425 ft msl. The sounding identified a cloud layer between about 4,000 and 12,500 ft msl. Light to moderate clear, mixed, and rime icing was indicated in two layers between 5,500 ft and 10,000 ft. The freezing level was located at 5,446 ft. At about 6,500 ft msl, near the accident airplane’s altitude before descent, the wind was from 335° at 6 kts, the temperature was about -8.6°C, the dew point was about -10.3°C, and the relative humidity was about 84%.

Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite number 18 visible and infrared satellite imagery from about 1651 depicted cloud cover above the accident site. The infrared imagery indicated a brightness temperature above the accident site consistent with cloud tops near 8,000 ft msl. Graphical forecasts for aviation valid at 1700 depicted broken cloud coverage with cloud bases around 5,000 ft and cloud tops around 9,000 ft msl. Text and graphical AIRMETs were valid for mountain obscuration and icing in the area.

Pilot statements and witness interviews also documented adverse weather in the area of Stampede Pass. One pilot described the weather as unseasonably cold, rainy, and windy, with isolated areas of heavy rain, poor visibility, and moderate turbulence. Another witness reported considerable cloud cover in the Snoqualmie and Stampede Pass areas, isolated showers associated with reduced visibility, ragged clouds, and mountain obscuration. A pilot report issued near the time of the accident described light to moderate turbulence and light rime icing at 6,000 ft msl. One pilot who flew in the immediate area about 30 minutes before the accident reported that the tops of the clouds were at 10,000 ft msl and dissipated as he flew west, out of the pass. AIRPORT INFORMATIONReview of the airplane’s records revealed that the most recent annual inspection was completed on September 30, 2023, at an airframe total time of 1,002 hours. The most recent recorded maintenance was replacement of the tailwheel on May 15, 2024, at an airframe total time of 1,016.8 hours.

According to the airplane’s flight manual, the published stall speeds at a weight of 870 kg were 57 kts at wings level, 61 kts at 30° of bank, and 68 kts at 45° of bank.

The flight manual states that flight into known icing conditions is prohibited. It instructs the pilot to immediately exit icing conditions by turning back or changing altitude to reach an outside air temperature less conducive to ice accumulation. It further directs the pilot to plan to land at the nearest suitable airfield. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe accident site was located on a north-facing slope of densely forested mountainous terrain at an altitude of about 3,100 ft msl. The airplane came to rest among densely populated cedar and fir trees th...