Accident Details
Probable Cause and Findings
The pilot’s loss of airplane control during a single-engine go-around. Also contributing to the accident was fuel system contamination, which resulted in detonation and a total loss of left engine power.
Aircraft Information
Registered Owner (Current)
Analysis
HISTORY OF FLIGHTOn July 19, 2024, about 1904 eastern daylight time, a Beech B-60 airplane, N23553, was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Vienna Center, Ohio. The private pilot and two passengers were fatally injured. The airplane was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91 personal flight.
ADS-B track data obtained from the FAA revealed that the flight departed runway 17 at Plattsburgh International Airport (PBG), Plattsburgh, New York, at 1651, destined for John Glenn Columbus International Airport (CMH), Columbus, Ohio. After departure, the airplane proceeded to the southwest and climbed to 16,500 ft.
About 1835, when the airplane was about 75 miles northeast of Youngstown/Warren Regional Airport (YNG), Vienna Center, Ohio, the pilot informed air traffic control that he was experiencing a problem with the airplane and requested a deviation to YNG. The controller offered information on a closer airport; however, the pilot requested YNG and its longer, 9,003-ft-long runway. At 1851, the pilot stated that the left engine was “dead.”
The airplane proceeded to YNG from the south and arrived overhead the approach end of runway 32 at 3,200 ft mean sea level, or about 2,000 ft above ground level (agl), at 114 kts ground speed. While descending, the airplane twice circled to the left near the approach end of runway 32, eventually lining up on final approach over the approach end of the runway, about 500 feet agl at 123 kts ground speed. The airplane then proceeded down the centerline of runway 32 while continuing to descend. About 3,500 ft from the departure end of the runway, the ADS-B data indicated that the airplane was close to the airport elevation at a ground speed of 131 kts. At the end of the runway, the airplane’s ground speed slowed to 95 kts. Airport surveillance video showed the airplane pitch up and to the left at the departure end of the runway; it continued into a left, descending turn until it impacted terrain about ¼ mile west of the departure end of the runway (see figure).
Figure. Final flight track and main wreckage site.
A witness on YNG taxiway D observed the airplane in flight before the accident. He stated that the airplane circled near the approach end of runway 32, then proceeded with the approach down runway 32. The airplane was higher than normal when beginning the approach. As the airplane proceeded down the runway, it descended; however, it did not touch down. At the end of runway 32, the airplane pitched up rapidly to the left and began to “flip.” The airplane then descended below his field of view. PERSONNEL INFORMATIONThe pilot, who owned and operated the airplane, possessed both Canadian and US FAA private pilot certificates with airplane single-engine land and airplane multi-engine land ratings.
The pilot’s personal logbook was not located after the accident. His hours of flight experience were estimated from an insurance application dated June 26, 2024. On the application, he stated that his most recent flight review was completed in October 2023 in a Beech B-60.
According to Transport Canada, the pilot held a valid category 3 medical certificate, issued on October 26, 2023, and valid until November 1, 2025. AIRCRAFT INFORMATIONThe pilot purchased the airplane on September 1, 2023, four days after the most recent annual inspection of the airframe and engines. The tachometer time at the inspection was 1,138.1 hours.
The last maintenance was recorded on July 17, 2024, at 1,168.1 hours. The service included application of sealer to the left and right wing deice boots near the fuel filler caps, and an oil and filter change on both engines. The mechanic who changed the oil reported that it was “black and nasty” when he first changed it, and the filter was installed more than two years prior. He changed the oil two more times before it finally cleared up and he signed off the maintenance in the logbooks.
An examination of the engine logbook entries for the 2023 annual inspection showed no entry for oil or filter changes for either engine.
A personal acquaintance of the pilot, who was familiar with the airplane, reported that the pilot asked him to fly the airplane, but he refused, citing airworthiness issues. He added that the airplane was parked outside in Plattsburgh, New York, for months without moving, and in the winter it was covered in snow. The airworthiness issues that he was aware of included damage from a hard landing, water in the fuel tanks, hydraulic issues (no fluid in the reservoir), and dry rot of the tires. He stated that the pilot reported problems with the left engine backfiring. He also stated that the pilot seemed to be in a rush to get the airplane flying again, and he warned the pilot to address these issues before the pilot flew it. AIRPORT INFORMATIONThe pilot purchased the airplane on September 1, 2023, four days after the most recent annual inspection of the airframe and engines. The tachometer time at the inspection was 1,138.1 hours.
The last maintenance was recorded on July 17, 2024, at 1,168.1 hours. The service included application of sealer to the left and right wing deice boots near the fuel filler caps, and an oil and filter change on both engines. The mechanic who changed the oil reported that it was “black and nasty” when he first changed it, and the filter was installed more than two years prior. He changed the oil two more times before it finally cleared up and he signed off the maintenance in the logbooks.
An examination of the engine logbook entries for the 2023 annual inspection showed no entry for oil or filter changes for either engine.
A personal acquaintance of the pilot, who was familiar with the airplane, reported that the pilot asked him to fly the airplane, but he refused, citing airworthiness issues. He added that the airplane was parked outside in Plattsburgh, New York, for months without moving, and in the winter it was covered in snow. The airworthiness issues that he was aware of included damage from a hard landing, water in the fuel tanks, hydraulic issues (no fluid in the reservoir), and dry rot of the tires. He stated that the pilot reported problems with the left engine backfiring. He also stated that the pilot seemed to be in a rush to get the airplane flying again, and he warned the pilot to address these issues before the pilot flew it. WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATIONThe wreckage was located on airport property, outside the perimeter fence. The wreckage was found upright in a grassy field, oriented on a 310° heading. A postaccident fire consumed a majority of the wreckage. All structural components of the airplane were found within the wreckage debris path. All three landing gear actuators were found in the extended (down) positions. The landing gear selector was in the extended position. The left and right wing flap actuators were found in the fully extended positions. The rudder trim actuator was found near the neutral position.
All primary flight control surfaces (ailerons, elevator, and rudder), with their appropriate trim tabs and flaps, were accounted for at the wreckage site. Continuity of all primary flight control cables was confirmed from the cockpit to their respective flight control surfaces.
The wing fuel tanks were destroyed by the postaccident fire. The left and right fuel selector valves consisted of three positions: Off, Main, and Crossfeed. Both valves were found in the Main tank position.
The left engine propeller assembly remained attached to the engine at the crankshaft flange. All three blades appeared to be at the feathered position. Although the blades exhibited varying degrees of impact and heat damage, there were no indications of rotational damage consistent with engine operation at the time of impact.
The right engine propeller assembly remained attached to the engine at the crankshaft flange. All three blades appeared to be angled toward a feathered position. The outboard half of one blade was fractured midspan and was not located. The tips of the other two blades were broken off and were not located. All three blades exhibited varying degrees of blade twisting, chordwise scratching, and surface polishing.
The engines were examined after recovery of the wreckage to a salvage facility.
The left engine exhibited impact and thermal damage. The engine’s crankshaft was rotated manually, and compression and suction were observed on all cylinders except cylinder No. 4. An internal borescope examination of that cylinder revealed evidence of detonation damage to the piston. The piston face showed signs of detonation with about a 1-inch-diameter material deformation and a missing section along the edge at the 8 o’clock position, where material was eroded or melted away. The spark plugs for the No. 4 cylinder showed melted material on the electrodes.
An examination of the left-engine fuel servo revealed it was securely installed to the top of the engine with all lines tight and secure. Fuel was present upon removal of various lines to the servo and injectors. The fuel inlet screen was present within the servo; contamination with a sand-like substance was found both in the screen and within the screen port of the servo body. Light from a high-lumen flashlight did not pass through the filter screen mesh after the debris was removed. The diaphragms were removed and found to be free of any tears or damage. The fuel-side diaphragm and servo body were found to have a small amount of the same sand-like substance that was found within the fuel inlet screen.
The right engine exhibited impact and thermal damage. A lighted borescope was used to examine the interior of the cylinders. Each cylinder was unremarkable with the exception of cylinder No. 2; its exhaust valve showed a coloration consistent with high heat and lean engine operation. Engine compression and suction were noted on all cylinders when the right engine’s crankshaft was rotated manually. All spark ...
Data Source
Data provided by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). For more information on this event, visit the NTSB Records Search website. NTSB# ERA24FA308